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ABSTRACT 
 
       This dissertation is composed by two essays that explore the changes in 
corporate governance around the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) 2002. 
       In the first essay, I examine the relation between board structure and 
compensation as a bargaining game between the board and the CEO. Bargaining 
game theories describe an endogenous process of determining the structure of director 
and CEO compensation. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) altered the equilibrium of 
power between the board and CEO by changing the monitoring role of the board. 
SOX essentially provides a natural experiment to test how a shock to the bargaining 
game alters the balance of power between directors and the CEO. Using the ratio of 
director compensation to CEO compensation to proxy for bargaining power, I find a 
significant increase following the passage of SOX, consistent with directors gaining 
bargaining advantage. Moreover, firms with strong shareholder rights exhibit even 
greater evidence of power shifting to the directors. Overall, the results suggest that 
directors gain more power relative to the CEO in determining compensation plans and 
strong shareholder rights help firms to align directors’ incentives with those of 
shareholders. 
       In the second essay, I examine the relation between CEO compensation 
structure and acquirer returns. In the literature, researchers find that executive 
compensation structures influence corporate acquisition decisions. Equity-based 
executive compensation should reduce the non-value-maximizing behavior of 
acquiring managers. A series of corporate reforms such as SOX and the FASB 
 iv
expensing rule affected the structure of CEO equity-based compensation. I find a 
significant increase in CEO restricted stock compensation and a significant decrease 
in CEO option-based compensation following these reforms. I also find that CEOs 
with strong managerial power are more likely to receive more restricted stock in their 
compensation package after the 2002 reforms. Finally, I find a significant positive 
relation between the restricted stock compensation of acquiring firm CEOs and 
abnormal stock returns after 2002. This provides empirical support on the 
effectiveness of the shift away from options towards restricted stock in executive 
compensation packages. Restricted stock is associated with better merger decisions.            
 
 
 
 v
 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
 
       I would like to express my enormous gratitude to my advisor, Dr. Melissa 
Frye, for her patience, guidance, encouragement, and invaluable advice throughout 
the entire dissertation process.  I am also in debt to the members of my dissertation 
committee, for their insightful suggestions and the time and effort they spent 
reviewing the various renditions of this dissertation before it takes its current shape: 
 
Dr. Vladimir Gatchev, University of Central Florida 
Dr. Charles Schnitzlein, University of Central Florida 
Dr. Ann Marie Whyte, University of Central Florida 
Dr. Terry Campbell, University of Delaware 
 vi
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
List of Figures ............................................................................................................ viii 
List of Tables ................................................................................................................ix 
List of Tables ................................................................................................................ix 
Chapter 1 Introduction ...................................................................................................1 
Chapter 2 Bargaining between Directors and CEOs: The SOX Effect .........................2 
2.1 Introduction..........................................................................................................2 
2.2 Background on the Sarbanes-Oxley Act..............................................................6 
2.3 Literature review..................................................................................................8 
2.4 Hypotheses.........................................................................................................10 
2.5 Sample and Summary Statistics.........................................................................12 
2.5.1 Variable definitions.....................................................................................13 
2.5.2 Summary statistics ......................................................................................14 
2.6 Results................................................................................................................16 
2.6.1 Director versus CEO...................................................................................16 
2.6.2 Effects of SOX on bargaining power..........................................................16 
2.6.2.1 Analysis of Soxdummy........................................................................19 
2.6.2.2 Control variables related to director and CEO power..........................19 
2.6.2.3 Other control variables.........................................................................20 
2.6.3 Difference between firms with strong and weak shareholder rights...........21 
2.6.4 Robustness of Results .................................................................................23 
2.7 Conclusion .........................................................................................................24 
2.8 References..........................................................................................................26 
Chapter 3 CEO Compensation Structure and Acquirer Returns..................................37 
3.1 Introduction........................................................................................................37 
3.2 Hypothesis..........................................................................................................41 
3.3 Analysis of the Change in CEO Equity Compensation .....................................45 
3.3.1 Time trend of CEO equity compensation ...................................................45 
 vii
3.3.2 Analysis of the change in restricted stock...................................................47 
3.4 Sample and Summary Statistics for Acquisitions..............................................48 
3.5 Research Methods for Acquisitions ...................................................................49 
3.5.1 Variable constructions ................................................................................49 
3.5.1.1 Acquirer Return ...................................................................................50 
3.5.1.2 Incentive Compensations .....................................................................50 
3.5.1.3 Other Determinants of Bidder Returns ................................................51 
3.6 Empirical Findings for Acquisitions:.................................................................55 
3.6.1 Effects of incentive compensations on CARs.............................................55 
3.6.2 Robustness of Results .................................................................................58 
3.7 Conclusion .........................................................................................................58 
3.8 References..........................................................................................................61 
Chapter 4 Conclusion...................................................................................................76 
 
 viii
LIST OF FIGURES 
 
Figure 3.1 Trends in restricted stock and options for all firms....................................67 
 ix
LIST OF TABLES 
 
Table 2.1 Structure of Director and CEO Compensation by Year ..............................30 
Table 2.2 Differences between Pre-Sox Compensations and Post-Sox Compensations
......................................................................................................................................32 
Table 2.3 SOX Effect on All Companies.....................................................................33 
Table 2.4 Differences between Compensation Structure of Strong Shareholder Rights 
Companies and those of Weak Shareholder Rights companies...................................34 
Table 2.5 SOX Effect on Weak Shareholder Rights Companies.................................35 
Table 2.6 SOX Effect on Strong Shareholder Rights Companies ...............................36 
Table 3.1 Structure of CEO Compensation by Year....................................................68 
Table 3.2 Changes in CEO Equity Structure ...............................................................69 
Table 3.3 Determinants of CEO restricted stock .........................................................70 
Table 3.4 Sample Distribution .....................................................................................71 
Table 3.5 Summary Statistics ......................................................................................72 
Table 3.6 Comparison between Different Portfolios ...................................................73 
Table 3.7 Effects of CEO Incentives on Bidder Returns .............................................74 
 
 
 1
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
       Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) with the intention of 
restoring public confidence after a series of corporate scandals around 2000-2001. In 
the first part of my dissertation, I examine the relation between board structure and 
compensation as a bargaining game between the board and the CEO. SOX altered the 
equilibrium of power between the board and CEO by changing the monitoring role of 
the board. Using the ratio of director compensation to CEO compensation to proxy for 
bargaining power, I find that directors gain more power relative to the CEO in 
determining compensation plans and strong shareholder rights help firms to align 
directors’ incentives with those of shareholders. Moreover, firms with strong 
shareholder rights exhibit even greater evidence of power shifting to the directors. 
       In the second part, I examine the relation between CEO compensation 
structure and acquirer returns. In the literature, researchers find that Equity-based 
compensations influence managers’ corporate acquisition decisions. I find a 
significant positive relation between the acquiring CEO restricted stock compensation 
and abnormal stock returns.  This provides empirical support on the effectiveness of 
the shift away from options toward restricted stock in executive compensation 
packages. Finally, acquirers protected by more antitakeover provisions experience 
higher abnormal returns when their CEOs receive a greater proportion of their 
compensation from restricted stock and a smaller proportion from option grants. 
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CHAPTER 2 BARGAINING BETWEEN DIRECTORS AND CEOS: 
THE SOX EFFECT 
2.1 Introduction 
        In the era of heightened awareness of corporate scandals, the role of the 
board of directors is coming under intense scrutiny. To restore public confidence, 
Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX), which is viewed as the most 
far-reaching reform in corporate governance since the initial federal securities laws in 
1933 and 1934 (Donaldson, 2003).  One of its main objectives is to improve 
corporate governance by increasing the monitoring role of the board and 
strengthening the independence of the audit committee (Romano, 2005; Brown, 2006; 
Murray, 2006; Taylor, 2006). Pursuant to SOX, the NYSE and the NASDAQ required 
listed firms to have a majority of independent directors on their board. SOX also 
reduces the control of the CEO and the CFO over the finances by empowering the 
audit committee and accounting firms (Clark, 2002).  Essentially, SOX breaks the 
power equilibrium between the CEO and the board by enhancing the internal controls 
of the board and by directly limiting the power of CEO. 
However, the effect of this shift in power essentially becomes an empirical 
question.  To address this, I study the association between CEO and director 
compensation. Bargaining game theories find that the process of determining 
compensation is best described as a bargaining game between the board and the CEO.  
They suggest that the more powerful party will influence the size and structure of 
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compensation in its own interest.  Thus, weaker boards pay more to their CEOs, 
since the CEO is in a better bargaining position.   
More specifically, Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) model the bargaining 
game between the directors and CEO, where the powerful CEO influences the 
selection of the board of directors and his own pay. Bebchuk et al. (2002) argue that 
the CEO’s managerial power over the board of directors results in greater CEO 
compensation. Ryan and Wiggins (2004) suggest that the board of directors also 
exerts influence over the CEO to determine their compensation. They show that board 
compensation deviates from the optimal contract when the CEO is more powerful 
than the board.  In my paper, I extend this literature by analyzing the dynamic shifts 
in the bargaining power between the CEO and the board surrounding the SOX period.  
Specifically, I examine changes in director and CEO compensation from 
2000 to 2004 using data from ExecuComp. I find that both the size and the structure 
of director and CEO compensation significantly change over this period. Median pay 
per director is increased by more than $35,000 from 2000 to 2004, an increase of 
almost 57%. The median CEO compensation is increased by $573,190, an increase of 
23%. The median percentage of equity-based compensation for the CEO rose from 
45% in 2000 to 57% in 2002 and dropped to 45% in 2004. The percentage of 
equity-based compensation for directors increases by 3% on average.   
To examine whether the changes in director and CEO compensation were 
caused by changes in the bargaining power of each party, I use the ratio of director 
compensation to CEO compensation.  Essentially, I use this ratio as a proxy to 
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measure the bargaining power. If this ratio significantly increases after 
Sarbanes-Oxley, it suggests that directors gain more bargaining power over CEOs 
during this period, as their compensation increases relative to the CEOs. I also 
analyze the determinants of the compensation levels and explore how measures of 
managerial power and board independence explain the variation in the bargaining 
power proxy.  
       I find a significant increase in the ratio of director to CEO compensation in 
the post-SOX period, which is consistent with bargaining power shifting to the board 
of directors after SOX. I also find that CEOs who also serve as chair of the board 
(duality) are more likely to receive greater compensation, relative to that of the 
directors. This is consistent with more powerful CEOs being in a better bargaining 
position relative to the board. Similarly, CEOs in strong shareholder rights firms, 
where CEO power would be reduced, receive less compensation relative to directors 
than CEOs in weak shareholder rights firms. Directors in strong shareholder rights 
firms receive more equity-based compensation after SOX. In addition, I find that 
firms with older CEOs and firms with higher CEO ownership and higher director 
ownership are less likely to increase the percentage of equity compensation of CEO 
total compensation. Such compensation has drawn considerable scrutiny since the 
collapse of Enron. Overall, the results are consistent with the expectation that the 
increase in the monitoring role of the board leads to an increase in the board 
bargaining power over the CEO. 
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        This study contributes to the empirical literature that examines the 
bargaining game between the CEO and the board. The traditional view is that 
directors want to establish an optimal incentive compensation contract to counteract 
the barriers to effective governance.  Basically, the board of directors seeks to 
minimize the agency costs that exist between management and shareholders, with the 
compensation scheme being designed to serve this objective. However, empirical 
evidence indicates that CEOs can exert influence on their own pay to receive 
compensation in excess of the level that would be optimal for shareholders. In 
practice, CEO compensation can deviate significantly from those suggested by 
optimal contracting.  The results of my tests support the idea that CEOs influence 
their own compensation as do directors.  
My findings may be useful to regulators since SOX and its implementation 
rules adopted by the NYSE and NASDAQ dramatically increase the compliance cost 
of firms. The effectiveness of SOX in improving corporate governance has been 
questioned. My paper shows that the board of directors gains more power over CEO 
to win concessions in negotiations after SOX. 
My paper also contributes to the literature that examines the relation 
between CEO compensation and CEO power. Hallock (1997) finds that CEOs receive 
greater compensation when the board is less independent. Core et al. (1999) find that 
CEOs who are also chair of the board receive greater compensation. Cyert et al. (2002) 
also find that CEOs with influence over the board receive higher pay.  They also 
show that boards which are paid with high amounts of equity compensation tend to 
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reduce the non-salary compensation awarded to the CEO. However, none of these 
papers considers the dynamics of compensation structure and how the bargaining 
power between the CEO and the board is altered to react to changing corporate 
governance. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the 
background on the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Section 3 reviews the extant literature 
regarding agency problems and the relation between the board and CEO 
compensation. Section 4 develops the hypotheses. Section 5 describes the sample and 
data selection. Section 6 presents results. Section 7 concludes the main findings and 
offers implications for future study. 
2.2 Background on the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
“In response to a loss of confidence among American investors reminiscent 
of the Great Depression, President George W. Bush signed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
into law on July 30, 2002” Welytok Sarbanes-Oxley for Dummies (2006, p.9)1     
The recent flurry of corporate scandals, such as Enron, WorldCom, 
Sunbeam and Global Crossing, causes great concerns about the efficacy of corporate 
governance in monitoring managerial performance. CEOs of the fraudulent firms had 
the power to manipulate the financial reporting system and to influence the board and 
its various oversight committees (Gordon, 2002). To restore public confidence, 
Sarbanes-Oxley was signed into law in 2002. SEC Commissioner, Harvey 
Goldschmid, referred to SOX as the “most sweeping reform since the Depression-era 
                                                 
1 See Securities Act Rel. 8220 (April 9, 2003). 
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Securities Laws” (Murray, 2002) and President Bush called SOX “the most 
far-reaching reforms of American business practice since the time of Franklin Delano 
Roosevelt” (Bumiller, 2002).  
SOX imposes substantial new requirements on corporate governance, 
financial disclosure, and the practice of public accounting. Numerous studies (Rezaee, 
2002; Ribsten, 2002; Cunningham, 2003; Coates, 2007) have indicated the main 
objectives of SOX were: 1) to improve the reliability of financial disclosure, 2) to 
increase the independence of the audit committee, 3) to enhance the gatekeeper 
function of the outside accounting firms.  
The SEC implemented the provisions of SOX by adopting rules compliant 
to them. By the end of 2003, the SEC directed the NYSE and the NASDAQ to adopt 
implementation rules for almost all provisions of SOX. The major rules related to 
corporate governance include2: 1) if a firm is listed on NYSE or NASDAQ, then 
independent directors should make up the majority of its board of directors, 2) the 
director should be “independent” in a stricter sense, which according to the Act, 
means that the independent director should not be an “affiliated person” of the 
corporation or any subsidiary and may receive no more than a director’s fee for 
services. 3) the compensation and nominating/governance committees must be 
entirely composed by independent directors. 4) the minimum size of the audit 
committee is three members and all of them must be independent directors. In 
                                                 
2 For more details on the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and the governance provisions of the NYSE and NASDAQ, 
please refer to Public Law 107-204-July 30, 2002, The Practitioner’s Guide to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the SEC 
Release No. 34-48745, File Nos. SR-NYSE-2002-33, SR-NASD-2002-77, SR-NASD-2002-80, 
SR-NASD-2002-138, SR-NASD-2002-139, and SR-NASD-2002-141. For summaries, please refer to Engel et al. 
(2005) and Chhaochharia et al. (2007) 
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addition, the audit committee must consist entirely of financially literate individuals. 
One member of the audit committee must be a financial expert. Otherwise, the 
company must disclose whether it has such an expert, and if not, the reasons. 
The CEO usually negotiates with existing directors to nominate a new 
director to fill the vacancy on the board. In Hermalin and Weisbach (1998), they show 
that the board nomination process is partially controlled by the CEO and the 
monitoring effectiveness is determined by its independence. The SEC rules strengthen 
the independence of the board, especially the compensation and nominating 
committee, suggesting that the CEO may exert less influence on the board selection 
and compensation decisions after the passage of SOX. The changes in the structure 
and size of director and CEO compensation will shed the light on the shift of 
bargaining power between the board and CEO. 
2.3 Literature review  
The separation of ownership and management can lead to agency problems. 
The board of directors should monitor the firm’s managers to reduce agency conflicts 
(Fama and Jensen, 1983). Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) show that board monitoring 
efficiency declines as the CEO’s power outweighs that of directors. Directors retain a 
CEO only if he or she is valuable to the firm. However, a valuable CEO has more 
bargaining power to negotiate with the existing directors who will fill vacancies on 
the board. In their model, the CEO can nominate new directors who are indebted for 
their appointment. The CEO’s bargaining power over the selection process weakens 
the board independence.  
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Empirical evidence also suggests that CEOs have the power to influence 
board decisions. Hermalin and Weisbach (1988) find that the proportion of outside 
directors decreases with CEO tenure. Blanchard et al. (1994) find that firms increase 
CEO compensation when they receive a cash windfall. Yermack (1995) finds 
evidence of suboptimal CEO compensation with respect to stock options. He shows 
that stock option incentives are increased when accounting earnings contain a large 
amount of “noise” and firms provide option incentives to their CEOs because they 
face liquidity constraints. Yermack (1997) finds that CEOs receive more stock options 
before good corporate news. Shivdasani and Yermack (1999) also find that firms have 
fewer outside directors and more gray directors when the CEO affects the director 
selection process. Jensen (1993) argues that CEOs control the board meeting agenda 
and the information that the board has about the company as well as obstruct the 
selection of directors who disagree with them.   
Bebchuk et al. (2002) and Bebchuk and Fried (2003) examine the impact of 
managerial power on CEO compensation. They find that CEOs use their power to 
extract more rent in the form of compensation. They argue that the likelihood of 
adopting a compensation arrangement that is favorable to executives but suboptimal 
for shareholders will depend on the power that the CEO has to influence his or her 
own pay. They show that the large body of empirical work on executive compensation 
supports the managerial power theory rather than traditional optimal contracting 
approach which assumes that executive compensation is devised to maximize 
shareholder value. 
 10
Ryan and Wiggins (2004) suggest that the party with the bargaining 
advantage, either the board or CEOs, will receive greater compensation. They extend 
the bargaining model of Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) to show that directors 
explicitly or implicitly negotiate their own pay. The observed director and CEO 
compensation is the result of an endogenous process over a bargaining game between 
the two parties. If the board has power over the CEO, both director and CEO 
compensation are more closely aligned with shareholder’s wealth. If the CEO’s power 
over the board increases, compensation provides weaker incentives to monitor. 
The theoretical model and the related empirical findings discussed above 
suggest that 1) compensation is suboptimal, and does not necessarily maximize 
shareholders wealth; 2) compensation is the outcome of a bargaining game between 
the board and the CEO; 3) the more powerful party in this bargaining game, either 
CEO or the board, will influence the size and structure of compensation in its own 
interest; 4) compensation provides stronger incentives to monitor as the board gains 
power over CEO. 
2.4 Hypotheses 
The main purpose of this paper is to investigate whether SOX shifts the 
bargaining advantage to the board by examining the relation between director and 
CEO compensation. A weaker board should result in greater CEO compensation. 
However, a stronger board should be able to better bargain with the CEO thus 
resulting in less compensation for the CEO. Director compensation, relative to CEO 
compensation, could remain unchanged if CEOs retains their power after SOX 
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implying SOX was ineffective in achieving its goals of altering the balance of 
bargaining power between CEO and the board; it could increase if the bargaining 
power shifts to the board after SOX; or it could decreases if the bargaining power 
shifts to CEOs after SOX. I use the ratio of director compensation to CEO 
compensation and the ratio of director compensation to total director and CEO 
compensation to proxy for the bargaining power, which leads to the following 
hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: The ratio of director compensation to CEO compensation 
should significantly increase after the passage of SOX. 
Hypothesis 2: The ratio of director compensation to total director and CEO 
compensation should increase after the passage of SOX. 
        If the board has the bargaining advantage over the CEO in determining the 
compensation package, director compensation will provide stronger incentives to 
monitor the CEO (Ryan and Wiggins, 2002). Maug (1997) finds that director 
compensation packages with stock or options improve directors’ incentive to monitor 
the manager’s performance. Perry (2000) shows a positive relation between CEO 
turnover and compensation packages with stock or options for outside directors. 
Yermack (2004) shows director compensation can be used to motivate directors to 
monitor. Becher et al. (2006) show that increased equity-based compensation of bank 
directors is the result of the need for internal monitoring following deregulation. If the 
board has more power to negotiate its own pay after SOX, I expect to see an increase 
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in the percentage of equity-based compensation in total director compensation. The 
previous studies in director compensations lead to the third hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3: The equity-based compensation as a proportion of total 
director compensation should significantly increase after the passage of SOX. 
Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) construct a governance index to proxy 
for the balance of power between shareholders and managers in a corporation using 
the incidence of 24 governance rules. The index is constructed using charter 
provisions, by law provisions, other firm-level rules, and state takeover laws. As 
Gompers et al. (2003) note, the power-sharing relationship between shareholders and 
managers is defined by the rules of corporate governance. Firms with low index 
values have the lowest managerial power or strongest shareholder rights and firms 
with high index values have the highest management power or weakest shareholder 
rights. Firms with stronger managerial power (or weak shareholder rights) are more 
likely to be affected by SOX, since regulators were likely targeting such firms with 
governance reforms. I use this index to explore whether the boards of firms with high 
management power show stronger shifts in bargaining power.  
Hypothesis 4: Following SOX, firms with weak shareholder rights should 
experience a greater shift in bargaining power towards directors than firms with 
strong shareholder rights. 
2.5 Sample and Summary Statistics 
I collect director and CEO compensation data from Standard & Poor’s 
(S&P) ExecuComp database. The ExecuComp database reports all non-employee 
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director compensation and CEO compensation from 2000-2004 for the S&P 500, S&P 
Midcap 400, and S&P Smallcap 600. Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics of the 
sample data. I collect additional data for all explanatory variables from CRSP, 
Compustat, and IRRC. 
2.5.1 Variable definitions 
The non-employee director compensation is composed of an annual retainer, 
fees for attending meetings and equity-based incentives, including stock options and 
shares of stock. I follow Mehran and Tracy (2001) to use a modified Black-Scholes 
model to value the stock options assuming firms grant options at the money and with 
a ten-year maturity. I value the stock grants by multiplying the number of shares by 
the closing stock price from the preceding calendar year.  
Total director cash compensation is the sum of total meeting fees and the 
annual retainer. Total director equity compensation is the sum of the value of the 
stock options granted and stock shares granted. Total director compensation is the 
sum of total cash compensation and equity compensation. The percentage of EBC is 
total director equity compensation divided by total director compensation. This 
percentage represents the relative importance of incentive compensation in director 
total compensation. 
Total CEO cash compensation includes salary and bonus. Total CEO equity 
compensation is the sum of the value of stock options granted and the value of 
restricted stock. The percentage of EBC is total CEO equity compensation divided by 
total CEO compensation. Total CEO compensation is calculated as the sum of salary, 
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bonus, other annual compensation, value of restricted stock grants, value of stock 
options granted, long-term incentive payouts, and all other compensation paid to 
CEO.    
I obtain board of director ownership, the percentage of independent 
directors and the governance index from IRRC. Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) 
construct a “Governance Index” based on the incidence of twenty-four governance 
rules to proxy for the balance of power between shareholders and managers. Firms 
with lower governance index have stronger shareholder rights and weaker manager 
protections. Firms with higher governance index have weaker shareholder rights and 
stronger manager power. I divide the sample into two groups based on whether they 
are above or below the median for the governance index. The strong shareholder 
rights group (low G index group) includes companies with an index lower than the 
median of the governance index and the weak shareholder rights companies (high G 
index group) are those with an index greater than the median. In strong shareholder 
rights group, the board is more likely to gain bargaining power over the CEO, 
resulting in a more obvious shift in the size and structure of directors and the CEO 
compensation. I expect to observe the difference in bargaining power shifting after 
SOX between these two groups. 
2.5.2 Summary statistics 
The means, medians and standard deviations of director and CEO 
compensation are presented in Table 13. Over the sample period, the average cash 
                                                 
3 Table 1 reports the inflation-adjusted compensation figures. All dollar values are adjusted to constant 2004 
dollars using the CPI index. 
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compensation for directors increases from $28.41 thousand in 2000 to $38.91 
thousand in 2004. Average director EBC increases from 50.65% in 2000 to 58.19% in 
2004. I note that the mean of the director equity compensation declines from $93.06 
thousand in 2000 to $73.63 thousand in 2002, and then increases to $90.12 thousand 
in 2004. However, the median equity-based compensation for directors increases from 
$35.86 thousands to $56.18 thousands steadily. I find similar trends for the average of 
total director compensation, a drop by 2002 and an increase afterward. Average 
director compensation declines from $123.54 thousands in 2000 to $105.41 thousand 
in 2002 and then bounces back to $129.53 thousand in 2004. The median total 
compensation for directors also increases from $69.35 thousands in 2000 to $98.90 
thousands in 2004. It is clear that the trends of total director compensation are driven 
by changes in director equity compensation over the sample window. 
I also find changes in CEO compensation. Average CEO cash compensation 
increases from $1.47 million in 2000 to $1.77 million in 2004. However, the average 
value of equity compensation declines throughout the sample period from $5.32 
million in 2000 to $2.92 million in 2004. Therefore, the average total compensation 
also drops from $7.33 million in 2000 to $5.20 million in 2004. The average 
percentage of equity compensation in total compensation increases from 43.46% in 
2000 to 55.94% in 2002 and declines to 41.82% in 2004. 
There are also changes in the ratio of director compensation to CEO 
compensation. The average ratio increases throughout the whole sample period from 
2.88% in 2000 to 3.69% in 2004, consistent with directors gaining bargaining power 
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relative to CEOs. Overall, I find the average firm has changed its director and CEO 
compensation structure after the passage of SOX. 
2.6 Results 
2.6.1 Director versus CEO 
In Table 2, I examine how director versus CEO compensation changed 
around the passage of SOX (2000-2004). Total cash compensation of both directors 
and the CEO increases significantly over the sample period.  However, the changes 
in CEO equity compensation differ from those paid to the directors. CEO equity 
compensation decreases dramatically from 2000 to 2004. Total equity compensation 
paid to directors remains relatively constant over the sample period. The percentage 
of EBC of the CEO significantly drops after SOX. Both the ratio of director 
compensation to CEO compensation and the ratio of director compensation to total 
compensation significantly increase over this period. Thus, there are great changes in 
the size and structure of director and CEO compensation in the post-SOX period. 
Directors and CEOs both receive more cash compensation after SOX. Firms pay less 
equity compensation to CEOs. Directors, relative to the CEO, receive greater pay 
after the scandals. This is consistent with SOX effectively tilting bargaining power 
toward the directors. 
2.6.2 Effects of SOX on bargaining power  
        Next, I employ a panel model based on my cross-sectional time-series data 
after controlling for potential determinants of compensation.4 I use the ratio of 
                                                 
4 Even if it is possible to use ordinary multiple regression on panel data, the estimates of coefficients derived from 
regression may be biased because of the unobserved variables. Panel data can control for some of these 
unobserved effects. 
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director compensation to CEO compensation and the ratio of director compensation to 
total compensation to proxy for the bargaining power between CEO and the board 
since the literature suggests changes in the size of compensation can be used to reveal 
bargaining power. I analyze the determinants of the ratio of director compensation to 
CEO compensation and to total compensation and the percentage of EBC for the 
board. Following Becher, Campbell and Frye (2007), I use a random effects 
regression model. This model allows me to control for unobservable or neglected 
firm-specific effects that may be correlated with two proxy ratios or other independent 
variables.5 Hausman (1978) provides strong evidence that the unobserved effects are 
present in common econometric specifications. By choosing a random effect model, I 
control the endogeneity derived both from the conventional simultaneity and from the 
neglected firm characteristics (Cornwell and Trumbull 1994).  
Soxdummy equals one for data after SOX. This is used to determine if 
bargaining power shifts after the passage of SOX. I include control variables used in 
prior literature to explain the proxy for bargaining power and the percentage of EBC 
for directors6. Larger firms and firms with higher growth opportunities are more 
likely to have greater agency problems. I use the governance index (Gompers, Ishii, 
and Metrick(2003)) to proxy for managerial power. Firms with strong managerial 
power will pay their CEO more compensation than firms with weak managerial power. 
                                                 
5 It is better to use fixed effects model when the unobserved variables differ between firms but are constant over 
time. A random effects model needs to be employed when some of the omitted variables vary between firms but 
are fixed over time and others may be fixed between firms but vary over time. In this case, a random effect model 
gives more efficient estimators. The fixed effects model is a special case of the random effects model.  
6 In the literature, firm size, leverage, growth opportunities are often used to control agency conflicts between 
shareholders and managers. For more details, please refer to Smith and Watts (1992), Gaver and Gaver (1993), 
Jensen(1986) and Stulz (1990), John and John (1993). 
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In such firms, directors may be less likely to overturn poor compensation decisions. A 
firm with a low governance index is assumed to have good governance while a firm 
with a high governance index is assumed to have bad governance. Good governance 
firms are expected to use more equity-based incentives in their director compensation 
structure than bad governance firms.  
Following Linck et al. (2006), Boone et al. (2007), Hermalin and Weisbach 
(1998) and Ryan and Wiggins (2004), CEO age, CEO ownership and CEO duality are 
included as proxies for CEO bargaining power. Linck et al. (2006) and Boone et al. 
(2007) find that CEO age and CEO ownership are negatively correlated with board 
independence. Hermalin and Wesbach (1998) argue that firms are more likely to add 
insiders to the board as a part of the succession process when the CEO gets older and 
approaches retirement. CEO duality is equal to one when the CEO is also the Chair of 
the board. Ryan and Wiggins (2004) use CEO duality as another proxy for CEO 
power. They argue that a CEO who also chairs the board exerts more influence on the 
board of directors.7 Boone at el. (2007) also use outside directors’ stock ownership to 
measure the constraints on the CEO’s influence. They find that board independence is 
positively correlated to constraints on the CEO’s influence. 
The results from random effects model are presented in Table 3. The first column is 
for the model in which the dependent variable is the ratio of director compensation to 
CEO compensation. The second column is for the model in which the dependent 
                                                 
7 In Ryan and Wiggins (2004), they cite previous literature to support the use of CEO duality as proxy for power. 
For example, Pi and Timme (1993) find CEO duality correlate negatively with ownership for commercial banks. 
However, Brickley et al. (1997) find CEO duality makes CEO hold more stock. Dayha et al. (2002) find CEO 
turnover increases and firm stock price performance improves after these firms separate CEOs and board chairs 
and also have at least three independent directors. 
 19
variable is the ratio of director compensation to the total compensation of director and 
CEO. The third column is for the model in which the dependent variable is the 
percentage of EBC for directors. Results are for the period over 2000 to 2004.  
2.6.2.1 Analysis of Soxdummy  
Directors have significantly higher compensation relative to CEO 
compensation after the passage of SOX as Soxdummy is significantly positive. This 
result suggests that the bargaining advantage shifts to the directors and that CEOs 
receive relatively less total compensation after Sarbanes-Oxley. The ratio of director 
compensation to total compensation (director plus CEO compensation) supports this 
finding of bargaining power shifting toward directors since the Soxdummy is also 
significantly positively associated with the ratio. Soxdummy is not significant for 
director EBC, indicating that directors do not receive significantly higher proportions 
of equity-based compensation after SOX. 
2.6.2.2 Control variables related to director and CEO power   
Power control variables are also important. The governance index is 
negatively related to the ratio of director compensation to CEO compensation and the 
ratio of director compensation to director compensation and CEO compensation. 
Firms with high governance index values have lower ratios of director to CEO 
compensation and to total director and CEO compensation, consistent with the CEO 
being more powerful and increasing his relative compensation. The CEO duality 
dummy is significantly negatively related to the ratios of director compensation to 
CEO compensation and to director and CEO compensation. A CEO who also chairs 
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the board has more power to influence the compensation process and director 
nominations, resulting in higher relative CEO compensation.  
The age of CEO is significantly negatively related to the percentage of EBC 
for the board which is consistent with Hermalin and Weisbach (1998). In their model, 
older CEOs are nearer to retirement and such firms have less independent boards. A 
less independent board will prefer to receive less incentive compensation and also will 
be more difficult to bargain with CEOs, which leads to a lower percentage of equity 
based compensation for the board. The governance index is negative and statistically 
significant for the percentage of EBC in the director compensation. This is consistent 
with the notion that a higher governance index implies that greater managerial power 
results in a lower percentage of equity incentives in director compensation structures.  
The percentage of independent directors on the board is positively related to 
the percentage of EBC for the board. More outside directors increases the bargaining 
power of directors, suggesting more independent boards would use more incentives in 
their compensation contracts. Directors with higher ownership are associated with 
significantly lower levels of EBC. This may indicate that firms with higher director 
ownership may not need additional incentives in the form of EBC as director stock 
ownership itself can serve to align shareholder and director interests.  
2.6.2.3 Other control variables 
Other control variables are also significant. For example, firm size is 
significantly negatively correlated with the ratios of director compensation to CEO 
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compensation and to director and CEO compensation. This suggests larger firms pay 
CEOs, relative to directors, more compensation than small firms. 
Debt-to-assets (leverage) is significantly negatively related to the use of 
EBC in director compensation. Jensen (1986) and Stulz (1990) suggest that high 
leverage may prevent managers from taking poor projects, which makes EBC less 
necessary. Firm size is statistically significant and positive in explaining the 
percentage of EBC in the director compensation. This suggests larger firms are more 
difficult to monitor and may need more equity-based incentives to align the director’s 
interest with shareholders’.  
The findings in Table 3 are consistent with my expectations that 1) directors 
relative to the CEO gain greater compensation after SOX, indicating the bargaining 
power shifting; 2) directors receive greater proportion of total compensation (director 
plus CEO compensation) after SOX, consistent with the expectation that directors 
gain more power than the CEO after SOX; 3) directors do not show significant 
evidence of equity-based incentives increasing after SOX; 4) overall, the estimates of 
the control variables are consistent with existing literatures. 
2.6.3 Difference between firms with strong and weak shareholder rights 
In Table 4, I compare the changes in compensation for strong shareholder 
rights companies and weak shareholder rights companies. Total compensation for 
directors of both strong and weak shareholder rights companies significantly increase 
from 2000 to 2004. However, only strong shareholder companies show a significant 
decrease in CEO total compensation. The ratio of director compensation to CEO 
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compensation and the ratio of director compensation to total director and CEO 
compensation do not significantly change for weak shareholder rights companies, but 
significantly increase for strong shareholder companies. 
I use the same control variables to run the panel data for the two subgroups.   
Tables 5 and 6 report the results for weak shareholder rights companies and strong 
shareholder rights companies, respectively. The major difference between these two 
groups is the coefficient of Soxdummy. For the strong shareholder rights companies, 
in the models which the ratio of director compensation to CEO compensation and to 
director plus CEO compensation are the dependent variables, Soxdummy is 
significantly positive over the sample period.  However, for weak shareholder 
companies, Soxdummy is not significant in the same models. This somewhat 
surprising result suggests that SOX may not have had the intended effect of reforming 
governance at firms with weak shareholder controls. SOX appears to have had a 
greater effect on firms with “good” governance.  
The regression results presented in Tables 5 and 6 show directors in strong 
shareholder companies receive more incentive-based pay as a percentage of total 
compensation after SOX. This suggests that directors in firms with strong shareholder 
rights gain more power over the CEO to influence the compensation composition in 
the post-SOX period than directors in firms with weak shareholder rights. It may 
imply that CEOs in weak shareholder rights firms still retain strong power to bargain 
the compensation package with directors in their own interest after the passage of 
SOX.  
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2.6.4 Robustness of Results 
        For a robustness check to my random effects models, I run the same data in 
pooled OLS models8. The results are qualitatively similar to those reported. I also run 
tobit models on the same data9. For the percentage of equity incentives, I use the 
natural log of one plus the percentage of EBC for both the directors as alternative 
dependent variable. Moreover, I employ probit models to estimate the effect of 
director option grants on the same data set of explanatory variables by defining a new 
dummy variable as the dependent variable. Director option dummy equals one if 
directors get options, zero otherwise. I also drop 2002 data from the sample and run 
the previous regression. For all these alternative tests, the results are qualitatively 
similar to those reported. 
        To further verify the random effect models, I examine the predicted values. 
Less than two percent of the predicted values are less than zero when the ratio of 
director compensation to CEO compensation is the dependent variable and none are 
greater than one. For the percentage of EBC for both the director and the CEO, none 
of the predicted values are less than -1 or greater than 1. 
        As another robustness check for whether noncompliance and compliance 
with the SOX rules better explain the bargaining power shift than corporate 
governance index. I define the compliant firms as those with more than 50% 
independent directors in the board before SOX and non-complying firms as those with 
                                                 
8 The random effects estimates will be close to the pooled OLS estimates when the omitted variable is relatively 
unimportant.  
9 I use the tobit model to explore the robustness of my random effects model because a nontrivial fraction of the 
firms did not pay the equity compensation to their directors. The equity-based compensation of directors is 
comprised of a nontrivial fraction of zero value and a pattern of continuously distributed positive values. A tobit 
model is used to control for censoring at zero.   
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less than 50% independent directors before SOX. Non-complying firms are more 
likely to be targeted by SOX regulations. I separate the sample into complying firms 
and non-complying firms and run the regression on the same specifications. The test 
results are consistent with those from firms with strong and weak managerial power. 
The result supports the notion that firms with strong shareholder power act as they 
should to the passage of SOX to further reduce the CEO power. 
2.7 Conclusion 
This paper examines the dynamic change of bargaining power between the 
board and the CEO following changes in the securities laws regulating corporate 
governance. I seek to investigate the importance of the enhanced monitoring role of 
the board in the negotiation process of determining the compensation plans. 
Specifically, I examine changes in the size and structure of director and CEO 
compensation around the passage of SOX, which represents a time period of 
significant changes in corporate governance. SOX empowers the board to monitor the 
CEO. SOX breaks the equilibrium of the balance of power between the CEO and the 
board, suggesting a shift in the bargaining advantages between the CEO and the 
board. 
I find that directors, relative to the CEO, receive more compensation after 
the improvement in the monitoring role of directors caused by Sarbanes-Oxley. I also 
find that directors receive significant increases in equity-based compensation 
following SOX, which should increase their incentives to monitor management.  
These findings suggest that directors have greater bargaining power over the CEO 
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when SOX and the accompanying changes in the exchange rules impose stricter 
requirements on the internal controls of the board of directors.  
I also find that firms with strong shareholder rights exhibit greater 
bargaining power shifts toward the board. This suggests SOX may not have 
effectively altered governance structures at firms with weak shareholder rights.  It 
may imply that CEOs at firms with weak shareholder rights retain the power to resist 
the changes in their compensation imposed by the new reforms. 
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Table 2.1 Structure of Director and CEO Compensation by Year 
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Number of Companies 1,792 1,654 1,614 1,691 1,695 
Panel A: Board of director     
Compensation 
     
Annual Retainer     
 Mean 20.50 21.73 27.06 26.77 27.62 
 Median 21.23 21.33 26.25 25.67 25 
 Standard deviation 15.39 15.58 19.38 17.25 18.35 
      
Total Meeting Fees      
 Mean 7.91 7.69 7.89 8.80 9.56 
 Median 6.58 6.40 7.35 7.70 8.13 
 Standard deviation 8.14 7.82 7.94 8.49 10.80 
      
Total Cash Compensation      
 Mean 28.41 29.42 32.81 35.13 38.91 
 Median 27.42 28.27 31.50 33.37 36.25 
 Standard deviation 17.27 16.79 18.44 18.46 20.61 
      
Total Equity Compensation      
 Mean 93.06 85.14 73.63 75.03 90.12 
 Median 35.86 41.84 45.20 47.61 56.18 
 Standard deviation 237.03 148.81 121.84 104.08 138.83 
      
Total Compensation      
 Mean 123.54 116.44 105.41 110.96 129.53 
 Median 69.35 76.78 77.16 84.81 98.90 
 Standard deviation 236.82 148.48 121.61 105.97 140.84 
      
% EBC      
 Mean 50.65% 53.70% 53.71% 53.87% 58.19% 
 Median 54.30% 57.65% 58.06% 58.00% 59.26% 
 Standard deviation 32.46% 31.73% 30.32% 27.83% 27.82% 
       
Panel B: CEO Compensation      
Total Cash Compensation      
 Mean 1470.21 1391.93 1530.69 1615.78 1767.23 
 Median 987.28 940.87 1112.83 1083.35 1228.38 
 Standard deviation 1746.42 1867.72 1497.97 1925.45 2015.51 
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Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Total Equity Compensation      
 Mean 5319.431 4848.16 4164.26 2579.21 2918.90 
 Median 1050.747 1248.04 1937.65 1026.35 1236.28 
 Standard deviation 22550.06 16591.20 7548.88 4747.37 5782.13 
      
Total Compensation      
 Mean 7332.81 6787.85 6132.39 4690.21 5204.09 
 Median 2680.48 2718.02 3563.26 2591.79 3016.70 
 Standard deviation 23295.83 17485.78 8500.34 6252.28 7172.39 
      
% EBC      
 Mean 43.46 47.45 55.94 40.88 41.82 
 Median 44.96 51.91 57.05 43.14 45.45 
 Standard deviation 31.78 31.86 22.96 29.00 28.53 
      
Panel C: Director 
Compensation vs.            
CEO Compensation 
     
Dir/CEO       
 Mean 2.88% 3.04% 3.24% 3.57% 3.69% 
 Median 1.98% 2.07% 2.18% 2.60% 2.54% 
 Standard deviation 3.46% 3.79% 4.02% 3.54% 4.91% 
NOTE: This table reports descriptive statistics on board of director compensation by year.  All data 
are from ExecuComp.  All dollar values are reported in thousands of constant 2004 dollars using the 
CPI index.  Total meeting fees assumes the director attended all board meetings.  Total cash 
compensation is the sum of the total meeting fees and the annual retainer.  Total equity compensation 
is the sum of value of the stock options granted and stock shares granted.  Total compensation is the 
sum of total cash compensation and total equity compensation.  The percentage of EBC is the total 
equity compensation divided by the total compensation. Dir/CEO is the ratio of director total 
compensation to CEO total compensation. 
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Table 2.2 Differences between Pre-Sox Compensations and Post-Sox 
Compensations 
 
 Director CEO 
Total Cash Compensation   
Changes 11.79*** 484.02*** 
p-value  0.00 0.00 
Total Equity Compensation   
Changes 5.25 -1539.53*** 
p-value  0.30 0.00 
Total Compensation   
Changes 16.75*** -986.87** 
p-value  0.00 0.02 
% EBC   
Changes 0.12% -5.41%*** 
p-value  0.91 0.00 
Director/CEO   
Changes 2.29%** 
p-value  0.04 
Director/(Director+CEO) 
        Changes             
 
2.66%** 
 P-value 0.02 
NOTE: This table reports means for changes of various measures of director compensation and CEO 
compensation over year 2000-2004.  All data are from ExecuComp.  The p-value reports the significance of the 
difference between pre-Sox and Post-Sox.  All dollar values are reported in thousands. Total meeting fees 
assumes the director attended all board meetings.  Total cash compensation is the sum of the total meeting fees 
and the annual retainer.  Total equity compensation is the sum of value of the stock options granted and stock 
shares granted.  Total compensation is the sum of total cash compensation and total equity compensation.  The 
percentage of EBC is total equity compensation divided by total compensation. Dir/CEO is the ratio of director 
total compensation to CEO total compensation. Director/(Director+CEO) is the ratio of director compensation to 
the total of director and CEO compensation. Asterisks indicate significance at the 0.01 (***), 0.05 (**), and 0.10 
(*) levels. 
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Table 2.3 SOX Effect on All Companies 
  
 Determinants of 
DCC 
(All Companies) 
Determinants of DTT 
(All Companies) 
Determinants of the 
% of Director EBC 
(All Companies) 
0.098*** 0.092*** 0.821*** Constant 
(9.98) (16.66) (15.36) 
0.000 -0.000 -0.003*** CEO Age 
(0.25) (-0.19) (-3.51) 
0.000 0.000 0.000 Market-to-Book 
(0.33) (0.60) (0.19) 
0.006 0.003 -0.142*** Leverage 
(1.20) (1.09) (-4.55) 
-0.017*** -0.015*** -0.009 Size 
(-14.17) (-19.60) (-1.24) 
-0.001*** -0.001*** -0.013*** G Index 
(-3.33) (-4.23) (-6.53) 
0.002 -0.001 0.066** % of Independent 
Directors (0.34) (-0.19) (1.99) 
-0.002 -0.001 -0.096*** Director Ownership 
(-0.42) (-0.49) (-3.62) 
-0.006** -0.005*** 0.017 CEO Duality 
(-2.44) (-3.52) (1.11) 
-0.003 -0.001 0.100 CEO Ownership 
(-0.19) (-0.12) (0.94) 
0.005*** 0.004*** 0.013 Soxdummy 
(2.77) (3.53) (1.19) 
Wald χ2 276.15*** 329.26*** 110.21*** 
Observations 3,126 3,126 3,126 
NOTE. - This table reports results from random effects models.  The dependent variables are the ratio of Director 
compensation to CEO compensation (DCC) and the ratio of Director compensation to the total compensation of 
director and CEO (DTT). The percentage of EBC is the total equity compensation divided by the total 
compensation. CEO duality dummy equals one if CEO is also the chairman.  The market-to-book is the ratio of 
the firm's market value to its book value.  Leverage is defined as total debt divided by total assets.  Size is the 
natural log of total assets.  SOX dummy equals one for post-Sox years (2002-2004).  T-statistics are in 
parentheses. Asterisks indicate significance at the 0.01 (***), 0.05 (**), and 0.10 (*) levels. 
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Table 2.4 Differences between Compensation Structure of Strong Shareholder 
Rights Companies and those of Weak Shareholder Rights companies 
 
 Weak Shareholder Rights Strong Shareholder Rights
 Director CEO Director CEO
Total Cash Compensation     
Changes 11.97*** 536.16*** 11.06*** 479.44***
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Total Equity Compensation     
Changes -0.39 -827.00*** 15.46 -2543.93***
p-value 0.94 0.01 0.21 0.01
Total Compensation     
Changes 11.35** -269.26 25.77** -1914.26*
p-value 0.03 0.43 0.04 0.07
% EBC     
Changes 0.37% -6.04%*** 2.01% -3.96%**
p-value 0.78 0.00 0.26 0.02
Director/CEO   
Changes 1.89% 2.81%*** 
p-value 0.19 0.00 
Director/(Director+CEO)   
Changes 
P-value               
0.22%            
0.12 
3.21%** 
0.02 
NOTE: This table reports means for changes in various measures of director compensation and CEO 
compensation for weak shareholder rights companies and strong shareholder rights companies over year 2000 to 
2004.  All data are from ExecuComp.  The p-value reports the significance of the difference between year 2000 
and year 2004.  All dollar values are in thousands.  Total meeting fees assumes the director attended all board 
meetings.  Total cash compensation is the sum of the total meeting fees and the annual retainer.  Total equity 
compensation is the sum of value of the stock options granted and stock shares granted.  Total compensation is 
the sum of total cash compensation and total equity compensation.  The percentage of EBC is total equity 
compensation divided by total compensation. Dir/CEO is the ratio of director total compensation to CEO total 
compensation. Director/(Director+CEO) is the ratio of director compensation to the total of director and CEO 
compensation. Asterisks indicate significance at the 0.01 (***), 0.05 (**), and 0.10 (*) levels. 
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Table 2.5 SOX Effect on Weak Shareholder Rights Companies 
 
  Determinants of 
DCC (Weak 
Shareholder Rights 
Companies) 
Determinants of DTT 
(Weak Shareholder 
Rights Companies) 
Determinants of the 
% of Director EBC 
(Weak Shareholder 
Rights Companies) 
0.120*** 0.106*** 0.850*** Constant 
(11.99) (13.81) (10.78) 
-0.000 -0.000 -0.003*** CEO Age 
(-0.76) (-0.88) (-2.95) 
0.000 0.000 0.000 Market-to-Book 
(0.57) (0.70) (0.23) 
0.001 -0.001 -0.204*** Leverage 
(-0.18) (-0.09) (-4.95) 
-0.016*** -0.014*** 0.011 Size 
(-12.50) (-14.69) (1.13) 
-0.003*** -0.002*** -0.020*** G Index 
(-5.66) (-6.28) (-5.59) 
0.002 0.004 0.114*** % of Independent 
Directors (0.39) (0.98) (2.63) 
0.003 0.003 -0.076** Director Ownership 
(0.70) (0.90) (-2.33) 
-0.005** -0.004*** 0.007 CEO Duality 
(-1.98) (-2.37) (0.37) 
-0.009 -0.005 0.125 CEO Ownership 
(-0.52) (-0.40) (0.89) 
0.002 0.002* -0.003 Soxdummy 
(1.30) (1.64) (-0.25) 
Wald χ2 257.30*** 155.35*** 81.39*** 
Observations 1,784 1,784 1,784 
NOTE: This table reports results from random effects models.  The dependent variables are the ratio of Director compensation 
to CEO compensation (DCC) and the ratio of Director compensation to the total compensation of director and CEO (DTT). The 
percentage of EBC is the total equity compensation divided by the total compensation. CEO duality dummy equals one if CEO is 
also the chairman. The market-to-book is the ratio of the firm's market value to its book value. Leverage is defined as total debt 
divided by total assets. Size is the natural log of total assets. SOX dummy equals one for post-Sox years (2002-2004). T-statistics 
are in parentheses. Asterisks indicate significance at the 0.01 (***), 0.05 (**), and 0.10 (*) levels. 
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Table 2.6 SOX Effect on Strong Shareholder Rights Companies 
  
 Determinants of 
DCC 
(Strong Shareholder 
Rights Companies) 
Determinants of DTT 
(Strong Shareholder 
Rights Companies) 
Determinants of the 
% of Director EBC 
(Strong Shareholder 
Rights Companies) 
0.080*** 0.083*** 0.784*** Constant 
(4.63) (8.49) (8.77) 
0.000 0.000 -0.002** CEO Age 
(0.54) (0.20) (-2.21) 
-0.000 -0.000 0.002** Market-to-Book 
(-0.26) (-0.27) (2.25) 
0.014 0.007 -0.068 Leverage 
(1.48) (1.35) (-1.42) 
-0.018*** -0.016*** -0.028** Size 
(-8.21) (-12.52) (-2.46) 
0.001 0.001 0.001 G Index 
(1.11) (1.04) (-0.06) 
-0.003 -0.007 0.009 % of Independent 
Directors (-0.28) (-1.15) (0.18) 
-0.007* -0.007 -0.115*** Director Ownership 
(-1.66) (-1.37) (-2.61) 
-0.007 -0.006*** 0.026 CEO Duality 
(-1.66) (-2.71) (1.23) 
0.005 0.005 0.056 CEO Ownership 
(0.16) (0.28) (0.34) 
0.008** 0.006*** 0.034** Soxdummy 
(2.32) (3.06) (1.99) 
Wald χ2 89.89*** 219.19*** 35.58*** 
Observations 1,342 1,342 1,342 
NOTE: This table reports results from random effects models. The dependent variables are the ratio of Director compensation to 
CEO compensation (DCC) and the ratio of Director compensation to the total compensation of director and CEO (DTT). The 
percentage of EBC is the total equity compensation divided by the total compensation. CEO duality dummy equals one if CEO is 
also the chairman. The market-to-book is the ratio of the firm's market value to its book value. Leverage is defined as total debt 
divided by total assets. Size is the natural log of total assets. SOX dummy equals one for post-Sox years (2002-2004). T-statistics 
are in parentheses. Asterisks indicate significance at the 0.01 (***), 0.05 (**), and 0.10 (*) levels. 
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CHAPTER 3 CEO COMPENSATION STRUCTURE AND 
ACQUIRER RETURNS 
3.1 Introduction 
       Corporate Acquisitions is one of the important investment decisions made 
by managers, which reflects the effectiveness of corporate governance. CEOs may use 
this investment opportunity to exacerbate the conflicts of interests between managers 
and shareholders. CEO compensation contracts, especially equity-based compensation, 
are viewed as effective means to align managerial interests with those of shareholders. 
A series of studies in literature examine the relation between CEO compensation 
structure and corporate acquisition decisions (Jensen and Ruback, 1983; Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1988; Datta et.al, 2001). They find that CEO equity-based compensation is 
positively related to the acquirer returns.  
        However, a string of corporate scandals in 2000 and 2001 raised questions 
on the effectiveness of option grants and corporate governance in general. In response, 
Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) with the intention of 
improving corporate governance (Romano, 2005; Brown, 2006; Murray, 2006; Taylor, 
2006). Efendi et al. (2007) argue that the passage of SOX is driven by the positive 
relation between CEO in-the-money options and financial statement manipulation.  
Banerjee, Gatchev and Noe (2008) document a significant decline in CEO 
option-based compensation after the corporate scandals.  
        Moreover, in December 2002, the Financial Accounting Standards Board 
(FASB) issued Financial Accounting Standards 148 (SFAS 148) to require public 
 38
firms to expense stock options by the fair value method instead of intrinsic value. A 
switch to the fair value method increases the estimated option value and leads to a 
decrease in reported earnings. Researchers in accounting (Aboody, Barth and Kasznik 
(2004), Schrand, Carter and Lynch (2003, 2005), Core and Guay (2003) and Carter, 
Lynch and Tuna (2007)) find that this new expensing rule has removed the accounting 
advantage of option-based compensation and made restricted stock more attractive to 
CEOs.  Consistent with this, in July 2003, Microsoft CEO, Steve Ballmer, 
announced that Microsoft would stop paying option-based compensation and instead 
grant restricted stock compensation.  
       In general, the above new reforms in 2002 have led firms to reconsider the 
optimal CEO compensation structure or specifically the merits of option-based 
compensation. In this paper, I examine how firms change their equity incentive 
contracts after 2002 and whether this change affects acquisition decisions. To address 
this, I first examine the recent changes in CEO equity incentive contracts. I find that 
the proportion of restricted stock in CEO compensation significantly increases after 
the corporate reforms while the proportion of option compensation significantly 
decreases at the same time. The dramatic drop in CEO option compensation results in 
a significant decrease in total CEO equity compensation.  Thus, the reforms do 
appear to lead to firms altering their compensation packages.     
In addition, I consider the role that CEO power plays in the shift in CEO 
compensation.  Given that CEOs have influence over their own compensation 
(Bebchuk et al. (2002) and Bebchuk and Fried (2003)) I explore whether firms with 
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strong managerial power are more likely to shift their compensation toward restricted 
stock after the new expensing rules. Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal (2005) find 
executives believe that the market pays more attention to the cost of CEO 
option-based compensation since the expensing rule requires firms to moves the cost 
of stock options from footnotes to the income statement. Botosan and Plumlee (2001) 
find that option expensing significantly reduces firm reported earnings. Powerful 
CEOs are more likely to shift toward restricted stock to avoid the negative impact 
from expensing option-based compensation. I use the governance index identified by 
Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) to proxy for the balance between the strength of 
shareholder rights and the power of managers. I find that the CEOs at firms with 
stronger managerial power are awarded more restricted stock after the new expensing 
rule. 
  Finally, I examine how the change in equity incentives affects the decision 
making of CEOs by looking at acquisition decisions. CEO restricted stock 
compensation is positively related to bidder returns after the recent changes in CEO 
equity compensation structure, while CEO stock options have no significant impact 
on the abnormal returns of the acquiring firm. This result is robust to controlling for 
deal-specific characteristics, firm-specific characteristics, CEO ownership, CEO 
power, governance index and board characteristics.  
        This study makes three valuable contributes to the literature. First, my paper 
extends the literature by examining the relation between executive compensation and 
acquirer returns. The traditional view is that there is a strong positive relation between 
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manager’s equity-based compensation and bidder returns. However, since the 
corporate scandals around 2000 and 2001, CEO equity-based compensation structures 
have changed significantly. My results suggest that after recent corporate scandals 
restricted stock compensation is associated with better acquisitions, not option 
compensation or total equity-based compensation.  
         Second, I shed light on the discussion of the optimal structure of CEO 
compensation. Financial researchers and regulators have not reached a consensus on 
what the optimal structure of CEO compensation should be. The use of equity-based 
compensation seeks to minimize the agency costs that exist between management and 
shareholders. However, empirical evidence indicates that the CEO may increase 
non-value-maximizing behavior because he receives option-based compensation in 
excess of the level that would be optimal for shareholders. My paper provides 
evidence from the market for corporate control that supports increasing the use of 
restricted stock in CEO compensation packages.  
         Third, my paper contributes to the literature by examining the use of 
restricted stock in CEO compensation contracts. Many studies focus on option-based 
compensation (Core and Guay (2001), Ryan and Wiggins (2001), Yermack (1995), 
Smith and Watts (1992)). The recent option expensing rule provides a natural setting 
to explore the shift toward restricted stock and examine the effect of this change on 
CEO decisions. 
         The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the 
hypotheses for the study. Section 3 presents the empirical tests and results for changes 
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in CEO equity compensation. Section 4 describes the sample and data selection for 
firm acquisition decisions. Section 5 presents research methods for acquisitions. 
Section 6 reports the empirical acquisition findings. Section 7 concludes the main 
findings and offers implications for future study. 
3.2 Hypothesis 
       Recently a series of important corporate reforms were enacted in response to 
the flurry of ensuing corporate scandals. For example, Congress passed SOX to 
restore investors’ confidence in corporate governance in 2002. Pursuant to SOX, the 
NYSE and the NASDAQ required all the members on the compensation, nominating 
and auditing committee of listed firms to be independent directors. These new listing 
requirements decrease the executive option-based compensation (Chhaochharia and 
Grinstein (2009)). The new expensing rules by FASB in 2002 also reduce the use of 
option-based compensation and increase the use of restricted stock in CEO equity 
compensation (Carter, Lynch and Tuna (2007)). The above findings lead to my first 
hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: The level of different sources of CEO equity compensation shifts 
overall after SOX and the 2002 expensing rule.  
Hypothesis 1a: The proportion of restricted stock in CEO compensation should 
increase after SOX and the 2002 expensing rule.  
Hypothesis 1b: The proportion of option-based compensation in CEO compensation 
should decrease after SOX and the 2002 expensing rule. 
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       By not expensing in the 1990s, firms artificially lowered their personnel costs 
and thereby boosted profits. Core and Guay (1999), Matsunaga (1995) and Hall and 
Murphy (2002) find that the favorable accounting treatment of option-based 
compensation is attributed to the excessive use of options in CEO compensation. 
Recording option expenses in the income statement increases CEOs’ concerns about 
the greater visibility of their compensation (Core, Guay, and Larcker (2003)). Because 
options are believed to haved contributed to the 2002 corporate scandals (Efendi, 
Srivastava and Swanson (2007)), CEOs are concerned that expensing options 
increases the market’s perception about the cost of option-based compensation (Oyer 
and Schaefer (2005)). More importantly, option expensing removes the advantage of 
the favorable accounting treatment of option-based compensation and significantly 
reduces reported earnings (Botosan and Plumlee (2001)). A CEO’s current and future 
private gains (such as bonuses) are often contingent upon reaching certain levels of 
earnings, making them less likely to support the rule change.  
        Bebchuk et al. (2002) and Bebchuk and Fried (2003) find that a CEO can 
use his or her power to influence the compensation package in favor of his or her 
interests. If a CEO has strong power to bargain his or her compensation, I expect that 
he or she is more likely to demand restricted stock since he or she perceives a greater 
personal loss from option-based compensation after the expensing rule.  
Hypothesis 2: CEOs at firms with strong managerial power are more likely use more 
restricted stock after the new expensing rule. 
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       In addition to looking at compensation shifts, I consider their effects on 
managerial decision-making.  Mergers and acquisitions are important corporate 
investments that affect firm value. Managers’ acquisition decisions may be biased by 
their self-interests at the expense of shareholders (Berle and Means (1933) and Jensen 
and Meckling (1976)). Previous studies have documented conflicts of interests 
between managers and shareholders during acquisitions. Jensen (1986) and Lang, 
Stulz, and Walkling (1991) find that managers in firms with higher free cash flows are 
more likely to indulge in empire-building acquisitions to extract their personal 
benefits than to maximize shareholder wealth. Morch, Shleifer, and Vishny (1990) 
also find supportive evidence that managers gain personal benefits from 
value-reducing acquisitions. 
        Fortunately, earlier studies also show that executive compensation contracts 
can mitigate the conflicts of interest between managers and shareholders in firm 
investment decisions. Clinch (1991), Smith and Watts (1992), Smith and Watts (1992), 
Baber, Janakiraman, and Kang (1996) and Murphy (1999) find that equity-based 
compensation can encourage executives to take more risky but value-enhancing 
investments. Jensen and Murphy (1990) and Mehran, Nogler, and Schwartz (1998) 
find that shareholder value increases with equity-based CEO pay. Bliss and Rosen 
(2001) find that CEO equity-based compensation can prevent banks from empire 
building. Datta, Iskandar-Datta, and Raman (2001) document strong evidence 
suggesting that equity-based compensation in executive pay increases shareholder 
value in acquisitions during the 1990s.  
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        Such support for the merits of equity-based compensation may have 
contributed to the growth in the use of option-based compensation.  Hall and 
Murphy (2003) and Jensen (2005) document a rapid increase in option grants in CEO 
compensation in the 1990s. However, SOX and the expensing rule ended the golden 
age of stock options. Although restricted stock and options both provide incentives to 
increase firm value,  prior research related to restricted stock incentives alone is 
limited, perhaps because of the low proportion of restricted stock in equity 
compensation before the expensing rule. Compared to the dramatic explosion of stock 
options, CEO restricted stock awards on average account for less than 10% of equity 
incentives before 2001 (Feng and Tian (2007)). Therefore, it is interesting to examine 
whether the recent change in CEO equity compensation structure has an impact on the 
acquiring CEO’s decision. 
         In order to explore the impact of the changing trends in CEO equity 
compensation on firm acquisitions, I examine the relation between different sources 
of CEO equity compensation and bidder returns. Datta et al. (2001) only examine the 
relation between option grants and bidder returns. Whether adding restricted stock 
grants can provide incentives for better acquisitions becomes an interesting question. 
Cai and Vijh (2007) argue that the larger the size of CEO equity holdings, the stronger 
the incentives provided by those holdings. Restricted stock may be viewed by 
executives as being closer to owning shares.  Hodge, Rajgopal, and Shevlin (2008) 
even suggest that executives value stock options with a lottery ticket mentality rather 
than methods consistent with standard economic theory.  Thus, I argue that the 
incentive effects of restricted stock paid to acquirer CEOs become stronger after 2002 
if firms significantly pay more restricted stocks after the expensing rule. If firms being 
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to rely more on restricted stock to provide incentives after the new expensing rule, I 
expect to find supportive evidence from the market for corporate control.  
Hypothesis 3: Restricted stock provides acquiring CEO with stronger 
incentives to make better (i.e, higher CAR) acquisitions after 2002 expensing rule.  
3.3 Analysis of the Change in CEO Equity Compensation  
3.3.1 Time trend of CEO equity compensation 
       Extending the research of Datta et.al (2001), I examine trends in the different 
components of CEO equity-based compensation after the 1990s. Table 1 presents the 
means and medians of the different sources of CEO compensation.10  
      Total CEO compensation includes cash compensation (bonus and salary), 
equity compensation (options and restricted stock) and other compensation. The 
average restricted stock-based CEO compensation increases from $0.46 million in 
2000 to $1.09 million in 2004, while average CEO option holdings steadily decrease 
from 5.052 million in 2000 to 2.55 million in 2004. The average value of equity 
compensation also declines from $5.32 million in 2000 to $2.92 million in 2004, 
similar with the trend of option-based compensation. This result suggests much of the 
drop in CEO equity compensation is attributed to the decline in CEO option 
compensation.  
      Figure 1 shows the recent trends in the structure of CEO equity compensation. 
Figure 1 reports the average percentage of restricted stock versus option grants in 
CEO equity compensation. From figure 1, I note that the average percentage of 
                                                 
10 Table 1 reports the inflation-adjusted compensation figures. All dollar values are adjusted to constant 2004 
dollars using the CPI index. 
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restricted stock compensation in equity compensation dramatically increases after 
2002. In contrast, the percentage of option compensation in equity compensation 
dramatically decreases after 2002. This result is consistent with the findings of 
Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2009). They find that SOX and its implementation rules 
affected CEO compensation decisions. 
      I also use the regression to explore the changes in CEO equity contract after 
SOX. 
Proportion of restricted stock (options, EBC) = f (SOX, other control variables) 
SOX is a dummy variable which equals one if the data is after year 2002, otherwise 
zero. The dependent variables are the natural logarithm of 1+ the percentage of CEO 
restricted stock compensation to total compensation, the natural logarithm of 1+ the 
percentage of CEO option-based compensation to total compensation and the natural 
logarithm of 1+ the percentage of equity-based compensation in CEO compensation, 
respectively.  
          Larger firms are more difficult to monitor and may need more 
equity-based incentives to align the CEO’s interest with shareholders’. Jensen (1986) 
and Stulz (1990) suggest that high leverage may prevent managers from taking poor 
projects, which makes EBC less necessary. However, since equity compensation does 
not require cash outlay, firms would prefer to pay more restricted stock or option 
compensation other than cash compensation when the leverage is high (Yermack 
(1995)). Market-to-book ratio is use to control for the effects of growth opportunities. 
A firm with more growth opportunities is more likely to incur information asymmetry, 
 47
which increases the need for the use of EBC. The percentage of independent directors 
is included to capture the board independence. Ryan and Wiggins (2004) find that 
board independence is positively related to the use of equity compensation. Linck et al. 
(2006) and Boone et al. (2007) find that CEO ownership reduces board independence.   
 Table 2 reports the results11. I find that the proportion of restricted stock in 
CEO compensation is significantly higher after the passage of SOX as the Sox 
dummy variable is significantly positive. CEOs have significantly less option-based 
compensation after SOX. The Sox dummy is also significantly negative for CEO EBC 
level. This result suggests that overall CEO equity contracts shift from option-based 
compensation to restricted stock after 2002. This implies the restricted stock plays a 
more important role in providing CEO with incentives to maximize shareholder value 
after 2002. 
3.3.2 Analysis of the change in restricted stock 
   To explore whether more powerful CEOs are more likely to use greater 
levels of restricted stock after the expensing rule, I analyze the determinants of the 
proportion of restricted stock in CEO compensation and the ratio of restricted stock to 
option-based compensation controlling firm- and governance- specific variables used 
in hypothesis 1 to explain the use of CEO equity incentives12. Table 3 reports the 
results.    
                                                 
11 Using the same model, I also examine the changes in the percentage of restricted stock and option grants in 
CEO compensation over the passage of SOX. In the changes models, dependent and independent variables are 
yearly changes. However, the results are insignificant, which may be due to the changes in the percentage of 
restricted stock or options are noisy measurement including other information. 
12 Index is defined as governance index from Gompers et.al (2003). CEO compensation data come from 
ExecuComp database and firm-and governance-specific data are available in Compustat and IRRC database. 
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           The proportion of restricted stock in CEO compensation at firms with 
strong managerial power is significantly higher after the passage of SOX as the 
interaction variable (index* SOX) is significantly positive. This result suggests that 
more powerful CEOs are more likely to receive more restricted stock in their 
compensation package after 2002. Firms with strong managerial power also pay more 
restricted stock relative to option-based compensation to their CEOs after 2002. These 
results are consistent with my expectation that powerful CEOs who are likely to be 
able to influence their compensation package, prefer restricted stock in their equity 
incentive contracts after the 2002 expensing rule.  Since option-based compensation 
must be expensed, using restricted stock instead results in higher reported earnings, 
which may lead to higher future bonuses. 
   Other control variables are also consistent with prior studies. For example, firm 
size is statistically significant and positive in explaining the percentage of restricted 
stock. This suggests larger firms are more difficult to monitor and may need more 
equity-based incentives to align the CEO’s interest with shareholders’. Leverage is 
significantly positively associated with the proportion of restricted stock in CEO 
compensation, which is consistent with literature that firms would prefer more 
restricted stock as a substitute for cash compensation when facing difficulties in 
borrowing (Hall and Murphy, 2002). 
3.4 Sample and Summary Statistics for Acquisitions  
I collect acquisition data from the Securities Data Corporation’s (SDC) U.S. 
Mergers and Acquisitions database. I identify 1,268 acquisitions between January 1, 
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2000 to December 31, 2005. Following Datta, et.al (2001), I include transactions that 
meet the following criteria: (1) The acquisition is listed as completed. (2) The bidder 
has less than 50% of the target’s shares prior to the announcement and controls 100% 
of the target’s shares after the transaction. (3) The deal value is more than $1 million. 
(4) The acquirer has available financial statement information from Compustat and 
stock price and return data from the University of Chicago’s Center for Research in 
Security Prices (CRSP). (5) The acquiring CEO compensation data is disclosed in 
Standard and Poor’s ExecuComp database for the year prior to the acquisition date. (6) 
Corporate governance data are available in the Investor Responsibility Research 
Center’s (IRRC) database.  
Table 4 shows the summary statistics of the sample acquisitions by 
announcement year. The number of acquisitions drops off in 2002 and rebounds in 
2004. I also report mean and median acquirer market value of equity, deal value and 
relative deal size. The acquirer market value of equity is measured 11 trading days 
before the announcement. The relative deal size is calculated as a ratio of deal value 
to bidder market value of equity. The deal value, the bidder market value of equity 
and the deal relative size drop in 2002 and peak around 2004. 
3.5 Research Methods for Acquisitions 
3.5.1 Variable constructions 
        I use acquirer return as my dependent variable, three incentive 
compensations as my key explanatory variables, and firm-, deal- and 
governance-specific characteristics as my control variables.  
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3.5.1.1 Acquirer Return 
        I measure acquirer returns by market model adjusted stock returns around 
initial acquisition announcements. I get the announcement dates from SDC’s U.S. 
Mergers and Acquisitions database. Following Fuller, Netter, and Stegemoller (2002), 
I calculate 5-day cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) from the event window (-2, 
+2), where event day 0 is the acquisition announcement date. The CRSP 
equal-weighted return is used as the market return where the market model parameters 
is estimated over the 200-day period from event day -210 to event day -11. 
3.5.1.2 Incentive Compensations 
Total CEO compensation is calculated as the sum of salary, bonus, other 
annual compensation, value of restricted stock grants, value of stock options granted, 
long-term incentive payouts, and all other compensation paid to CEO. Total CEO 
cash compensation includes salary and bonus. I measure total CEO equity 
compensation by the sum of the value of stock options granted and the value of 
restricted stock. The percentage of equity-based compensation (EBC) is defined as 
total CEO equity compensation divided by total CEO compensation. ExecuComp 
reports data on cash and total CEO compensation including the value of stock options 
(using modified Black-Scholes method) and restricted stock grants. In order to fully 
capture the effects of CEO equity-based compensation and SOX, I interact the three 
equity incentives with SOX indicators to create the following three key explanatory 
variables: Rstk*SOX, Option*SOX and EBC*SOX. SOX is a binary variable that 
equals one if an acquisition deal is completed after 2002. Rstk is defined as the natural 
logarithm of 1+ the percentage of restricted stocks in a CEO’s equity compensation. 
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Option is the natural logarithm of 1+ the percentage of stock option grants in a CEO’s 
equity compensation. EBC is the natural logarithm of 1+ the percentage of a CEO’s 
equity compensation in total compensation package. 
3.5.1.3 Other Determinants of Bidder Returns 
Firm Characteristics: 
        Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2004) find that the acquirer’s firm size 
has a negatively relation with the cumulative abnormal returns (CAR). Their findings 
are consistent with Roll’s (1986) managerial hubris hypothesis. They document that 
larger acquiring firms pay higher premiums which lead to higher acquisition costs and 
lower returns. The bidder size itself is also an effective takeover defense since it is 
more difficulty to acquire a larger firm than a small firm. The CEO of the larger firm 
is more likely to make unprofitable acquisitions since he or she is less subject to the 
market for corporate control. I use the log transformation of the acquirer’s total assets 
(Compustat item 6) as the firm size in my regression test. 
        The relation between an acquirer’s Tobin’s q and CAR is not clear in 
literature. Moeller, Chlingemann, and Stulz (2004) find that the acquirer’s Tobin’s q 
has negative effect on the abnormal returns while Lang, Stulz, and Walking (1991) 
and Servaes (1991) find an opposite conclusion. I measure Tobin’s q by the ratio of a 
acquirer’s market value of assets to its book value of assets, where the market value of 
assets is defined as the book value of assets minus the book value of common equity 
(item 60) plus the market value of common equity (item 25 x item 199). 
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       Prior researches find free cash flow (FCF) and leverage of the acquiring firm 
have an effect on CAR. Leverage helps reduce managers’ non-value-maximizing 
investment since managers lose control to creditors when their firms fall into financial 
distress. I expect leverage is positively related to CAR in my empirical test. FCF is 
another important factor that influences the manager’s investment behavior. However, 
FCF has an ambiguous effect on CAR. According to Jensen’s (1986) free cash flow 
hypothesis, higher FCF encourages CEOs to engage in empire building. On the other 
hand, higher FCF also indicates better firm performance, implying higher quality 
managers who are more likely to make better acquisitions. Leverage is computed as a 
ratio of a firm’s book value of long-term debt (item 9) and short-term debt (item 34) 
to its total assets. FCF is defined as a firm’s operating income before depreciation 
(item 13) minus interest expense (item 15) minus income taxes (item 16) minus 
capital expenditures (item 128), scaled by book value of total assets. 
Deal characteristics:  
Following the existing literature, I include method of payment, relative deal 
size and target ownership status as control variables.  
Asquith, Bruner, and Mullins (1983) and Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz 
(2004) find that the relative deal size is an important determinant of bidder returns. I 
compute the relative deal size as the ratio of the deal value to the bidder’s market 
value of equity (from SDC). Consistent with the literature, I expect a positive relation 
between the relative deal size and bidder returns. 
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Previous studies have proven that the means of payment (cash or stock) is 
related to the shareholder wealth response to acquisitions. Travlos (1987), Amihud, 
Lev, and Travlos (1990), Servases (1991), and Brown and Ryngaert (1991) find a 
positive wealth effect of cash-financed acquisitions and a negative wealth effect of 
stock-financed acquisitions. I use two indicator variables to define the method of 
payment: cash and stock, where stock equals one for stock-financed deal and zero 
otherwise, and cash equals one for cash-financed deal and zero otherwise. 
Fuller, Netter, and Stegemoller (2002) find that bidder announcement 
returns significantly increase when the acquisition targets are public firms while 
significantly decrease when the targets are private firms, since bidders get a liquidity 
discount when they acquirer private targets. I use two indicator variables to define the 
target ownership status: public target and private target. Public target is a dummy 
variable that equals one if the targets are public firms, zero otherwise. Private target is 
also a dummy variable that equals one if the targets are private firms, zero otherwise.  
Governance Characteristics:    
        It is well known that CEOs at firms with better governance mechanisms are 
less likely to make the non-value-maximizing investment decisions. I include 
Governance index, director and CEO ownership, and CEO power proxies to control 
the difference in the effect of corporate governance on bidder returns. I obtain data on 
CEO and board of director ownership, the governance index and other governance 
characteristics from IRRC. 
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        Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) construct a “Governance Index” based 
on the incidence of antitakeover provisions to proxy for the balance of power between 
shareholders and managers. Firms with lower governance index are protected by less 
antitakeover provisions, and thus have weaker manager protections. Firms with higher 
governance index are protected by more antitakeover provisions, and thus have 
stronger manager protections. Masulis, Wang and Xie (2007) find that firms with 
higher governance index experience significantly lower abnormal returns around 
acquisition announcements while firms with lower governance index experience 
significantly higher abnormal returns. Their interpretation is that managers protected 
by more antitakeover provisions are less vulnerable to the market for corporate 
control. I expect the governance index is negatively related to bidder returns. 
        Prior work shows how important the board of directors monitors the 
managers in reducing agency costs. I control CEO duality, board independence and 
director and CEO ownership to capture a board function in corporate governance. 
 Byrd and Hickman (1992) find that board independence is positively 
correlated with acquisition announcement returns. Hermalin and Wesbach (1998) 
argue that independent boards are negatively associated with CEO power. Ryan and 
Wiggins (2004) use CEO duality as proxy for CEO power. They find that a CEO who 
also chairs the board exerts more influence on the board of directors and thus 
exacerbate the conflicts of interest between managers and shareholders.13  IRRC 
                                                 
13 In Ryan and Wiggins (2004), they cite previous literature to support the use of CEO duality as proxy for power. 
For example, Pi and Timme (1993) find CEO duality correlate negatively with ownership for commercial banks. 
However, Brickley et al. (1997) find CEO duality makes CEO hold more stock. Dayha et al. (2002) find CEO 
turnover increases and firm stock price performance improves after these firms separate CEOs and board chairs 
and also have at least three independent directors. 
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defines a director as independent if a director has no any affiliation with firms that he 
or she serves. This affiliation includes any family, financial, employment and business 
relationships with the firm. I create a dummy variable, CEO duality, that equals one if 
a CEO also chairs the board, zero otherwise. I expected the percentage of independent 
directors in the board is positively related to bidder returns and CEO duality is 
negatively related to bidder returns.  
Lewellen, Loderer, and Rosenfeld (1985) find that acquisition abnormal 
returns increase in acquiring managers’ ownership. Boone at el. (2007) also use 
outside directors’ stock ownership to measure the constraints on the CEO’s influence. 
They find that board independence is positively correlated to constraints on the CEO’s 
influence. Therefore, I add CEO equity ownership and director equity ownership to 
my control variables.  
Table 5 presents the summary statistics of the above control variables. The 
average firm size is $8.4 billion as the firms available in IRRC database are relatively 
large firms. The average leverage and Tobin’s q of my sample are similar to those in 
Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2004). 
3.6 Empirical Findings for Acquisitions: 
3.6.1 Effects of incentive compensations on CARs  
         In Panel A of Table 6, I compare the differences in CEO incentive 
compensation and 5-day CARs before and after SOX. On average, the proportion of 
restricted stock after SOX is significantly higher than that before SOX. The average 
percentage of options after SOX is significantly lower than that before SOX. The 
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average EBC experiences the same significant drop after SOX as options. The 
average announcement abnormal returns after SOX are significantly higher than that 
before SOX.  
          The Panel B of Table 6 reports the difference in CARs between high and 
low levels of difference sources of CEO equity compensation. The high level 
portfolio is composed of bidders with CEO compensation above the sample median 
and the high level portfolio is composed of bidders with CEO compensation below or 
equal to sample median. On average, the high restricted stock firms experience 
significantly higher abnormal returns than the low level firms. The average bidder 
returns of high option compensation firms are not significantly different from that of 
low level option firms. The high and low EBC firms also show the same result as 
option portfolios. The above results support my previous hypothesis about the effects 
of different sources of CEO equity compensation on bidder returns. However, control 
variables may be important. 
I employ cross-sectional regressions to examine whether the components of 
CEO equity-based compensation have different affects on bidder returns around 
acquisition announcements. The dependent variable is the 5-day CAR. I separately 
examine the effects of restricted stock, options and total equity-based compensation 
on the CARs and report regression results in Table 7.14 The first column includes 
                                                 
14 For robustness, I also try limited model specifications. First, I use a baseline model where the only controls are 
size and acquisition payment method. Second, I use the baseline model plus add controls for the firm- and 
deal-specific characteristics introduced earlier.  The results are qualitatively similar to those reported using the 
complete model.  
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restricted stock and restricted Stock*SOX. The second column includes options and 
options*SOX. The third column uses EBC and EBC*SOX.  
       In the first column of Table 7, the coefficient estimate of Restricted 
Stock*SOX is 0.129 with a t-statistic of 2.22, indicating a significant positive relation 
between the acquiring CEO restricted stock compensation and the CARs after 2002. 
This result suggests that a CEO who receives more restricted stock is more likely to 
make better acquisitions after 2002. However, the coefficient estimates for 
Option*SOX and EBC*SOX are insignificant, suggesting they do not provide 
value-creating incentives to the acquiring CEOs to take value-enhancing deals after 
SOX. This result is consistent with my expectation that firms generally shift toward 
restricted stock to provide incentives to CEOs after the expensing rule by FASB. Most 
firms had relied primarily on options to provide equity incentives before (Lambert and 
Larcker (2004)). This finding sheds light on the evidence of a structural shift away 
from option incentives to restricted stock incentives after 200215. 
        The coefficient estimates of CEO restricted stock, stock options and total 
equity-based compensations are not significant over the sample period. The results 
may imply that the significant increase in CEO restricted stock after SOX has had a 
positive impact on bidder returns and the significant decrease in CEO option and total 
equity compensation at least do not hurt shareholders of acquiring firms in corporate 
acquisitions.  
                                                 
15 I also use the yearly changes in the percentage of restricted stock and options as the key independent variables. 
However, the test results are not significant. 
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The control variables generally have the expected signs. I find public target 
is significantly negatively related to the acquirer’s announcement-period CAR. This 
result suggests firms experience significantly lower abnormal returns when buying 
public firms, echoing the findings of Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2004).  In 
the third column of Table 7, relative deal size is negative and marginally significant, 
which suggest that the acquirer’s announcement returns decrease in relative deal size. 
3.6.2 Robustness of Results 
        For a robustness check to my models, I use the variables in the regression 
without their natural logarithmic transformations.16  I also regress tobit models on 
the same data.17 The results are qualitatively similar to those reported. To further 
verify the effect on bidder returns, I compute the acquirer announcement returns over 
different event windows, like (0,+2), (-1,+1), (-1,0) and (0,+1), where event day 0 is 
the acquisition announcement date. The results remain qualitatively similar when I 
use the different CARs.  
3.7 Conclusion 
This paper examines trends in CEO equity compensation structure and the 
relation between compensation and acquirer returns around the passage of SOX.  
Following the 2002 corporate scandals, the excessive use of option compensation has 
been at the center of a heated debate among corporate reformers. Un-expensed 
options were believed to contribute to corporate accounting misreporting. SOX, its 
                                                 
16 Using the proportion of CEO salary in total compensation as key explanatory variable, I find there is no 
significant relation between CEO salary level and bidder returns. I also run the regression with both restricted 
stock and options as control variables, the results are also qualitatively similar. 
17 I use tobit models to control for the nontrivial fraction of the firms that did not pay the restricted stock or 
options to their CEOs.  
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implementation rule adopted by NYSE and NASDQ, and the FASB expensing rule 
drove firms to reconsider optimal CEO compensation. The expensing rule especially 
increases the cost associated with option-based compensation. Therefore, I investigate 
whether CEO equity incentive contracts change after the above reforms and how 
important the recent shifts in CEO equity-based compensation structures are in 
influencing bidder returns.  
I find that CEO equity-based compensation structure has shifted towards 
restricted stock after 2002.  Firms, on average, significantly increase the use of 
restricted stock and decrease the use of option-based compensation after 2002. Firms 
with strong managerial power pay their CEOs more restricted stock and less 
option-based compensation than firms with weak managerial power. Larger firms are 
more likely to use restricted stock. Firms with more leverage also significantly 
increase the use of restricted stock.  
I also find acquirers using more restricted stock-based compensation for 
CEOs after 2002 experience significantly higher bidder announcement stock returns. 
This result suggests that providing additional restricted stock incentives in CEO 
contracts might be advantageous in motivating CEOs to make better acquisitions after 
the expensing rule.  
My study has important implications for understanding the recent changes 
in CEO equity contracts and the role of different incentives in acquiring CEOs’ 
decisions. Dittmann and Maug (2007) argue that CEOs should have an optimal equity 
compensation package of no options and more restricted stock. This paper provides 
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strong support for this view from the market for corporate control and sheds new light 
on the notion that the optimal CEO equity incentive contract has changed.  
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Figure 3.1 Trends in restricted stock and options for all firms  
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Table 3.1 Structure of CEO Compensation by Year  
 
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Observations 1,792 1,654 1,614 1,691 1,695 
Restricted Stock      
 Mean 458.92 468.7157 666.45 1005.28 1093.81 
 Median 0 0 0 0 0 
Options      
 Mean 5052.44 4076.59 3635.79 2417.40 2547.29 
 Median 1026.27 1001.06 1698.25 1223.14 1196.19 
Total Equity Compensation      
 Mean 5319.43 4848.16 4164.26 2579.21 2918.90 
 Median 1050.75 1248.04 1937.65 1026.35 1236.28 
Total Compensation      
 Mean 7332.81 6787.85 6132.39 4690.21 5204.09 
 Median 2680.48 2718.02 3563.26 2591.79 3016.70 
Total Cash Compensation      
 Mean 1470.21 1391.93 1530.69 1615.78 1767.23 
 Median 987.28 940.87 1112.83 1083.35 1228.38 
NOTE: This table reports descriptive statistics on CEO compensation by year.  All data are from 
ExecuComp.  All dollar values are reported in thousands of constant 2004 dollars using the CPI index.  
Total equity compensation is the sum of value of the stock options granted and stock shares granted.  
Total compensation is the sum of total cash compensation and total equity compensation.   
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Table 3.2 Changes in CEO Equity Structure  
 
 %Restricted Stock %Option %EBC 
0.037*** -0.055*** -0.484*** SOX 
(8.21) (-6.40) (-6.05) 
0.032*** 0.034*** 0.452*** Size 
(10.50) (5.77) (8.81) 
0.065*** -0.236*** -0.862*** Leverage 
(5.02) (-9.47) (-10.41) 
0.000 0.000 -0.000 Market- to- book 
 (-0.46) (0.38) (-0.13) 
0.002** -0.008*** -0.191*** Index 
(2.03) (-4.60) (-8.50) 
0.042*** 0.104*** 0.174 % of Independent 
Directors (3.17) (4.12) (1.41) 
Wald χ2 310.79*** 164.25*** 250.98*** 
Observations 4780 4780 4780 
NOTE. - This table reports results from random effects models.  The dependent variable is the percentage of 
restricted stock, options and total equity compensation to CEO compensation. The market-to-book is the ratio of 
the firm's market value to its book value.  Leverage is defined as total debt divided by total assets.  Size is the 
natural log of total assets.  SOX dummy equals one for post-Sox years (2002-2004).  T-statistics are in 
parentheses. Asterisks indicate significance at the 0.01 (***), 0.05 (**), and 0.10 (*) levels. 
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Table 3.3 Determinants of CEO restricted stock  
 
 %Restricted Stock (Restricted Stock)/Option   
0.029*** 0.123  Size 
(8.21) (1.64)  
Market-to-book -0.000 -0.000  
 (-0.54) (-0.06)  
0.064*** 0.075  Leverage 
(4.78) (0.24)  
0.024* -0.350  % of Independent 
Directors (1.72) (-1.06)  
-0.001* -0.004  CEO ownership 
 (-1.94) (0.36)  
0.001 -0.011  Index 
(-0.59) (-0.52)  
-0.004 -0.039  SOX 
(-0.22) (-0.79)  
Index*SOX 0.003** 0.014***  
 (2.10) (2.79)  
Wald χ2 310.79*** 164.25***  
Observations 4780 4780  
NOTE. - This table reports results from random effects models.  The dependent variables are the percentage of 
restricted stock and the ratio of restricted stock to options. The market-to-book is the ratio of the firm's market 
value to its book value.  Leverage is defined as total debt divided by total assets.  Size is the natural log of total 
assets.  SOX dummy equals one for post-Sox years (2002-2004).  T-statistics are in parentheses. Asterisks 
indicate significance at the 0.01 (***), 0.05 (**), and 0.10 (*) levels. 
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Table 3.4 Sample Distribution  
 
Year Number of 
Acquisitions 
Percentage of 
Sample 
Mean Deal 
Value ($mil) 
(Median) 
Mean Acquirer 
Market Value of 
Equity ($mil) 
(Median) 
Mean 
Relative Size 
(Median) 
2000 199 15.7 505 
(122) 
14,733 
(2,016) 
0.18
(0.05) 
2001 184 14.5 425 
(118) 
15,360 
(2,236) 
0.17
(0.05) 
2002 203 16.0 547 
(65) 
12,976 
(1,727) 
0.09
(0.03) 
2003 162 12.8 378 
(88) 
11,936 
(2,695) 
0.08
(0.03) 
2004 232 18.3 376 
(100) 
14,081 
(2,111) 
0.12
(0.04) 
2005 288 22.7 752 
(90) 
14,136 
(2,630) 
0.12
(0.03) 
Total 1,268 100 519 
(89) 
13,783 
(2,275) 
0.12
(0.04) 
NOTE: The sample consists of 1,268 completed U.S. mergers and acquisitions (listed in SDC) between 
2000 and 2005 made by firms covered by the ExecuComp&IRRC database.   
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Table 3.5 Summary Statistics  
 
 Mean Median St. Dev 
Firm-Deal Characteristics 
Total assets ($mil) 8,467 1,280 28,599 
Stock (dummy) 0.18 0.00 0.39 
Tobin’s q 2.53 1.78 2.49 
Free Cash Flow 0.05 0.05 0.08 
Leverage 0.22 0.21 0.17 
Market-to-book 3.78 2.63 2.40 
Relative deal size 0.12 0.04 0.36 
Public target(dummy) 0.20 0.00 0.40 
Private target(dummy) 0.40 0.00 0.48 
Governance Characteristics 
Index 9.43 8.00 2.65 
%of Independent directors 0.67 0.70 0.17 
Director ownership 0.10 0.03 0.19 
CEO Duality(dummy) 0.81 1.00 0.39 
CEO ownership 0.02 0.01 0.06 
NOTE: The sample consists of 1, 268 completed US mergers and acquisitions from SDC between 
2000 and 2005 made by firms disclosed by the IRRC and Compustat database. Variable definitions 
are in section 4. 
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Table 3.6 Comparison between Different Portfolios  
 
NOTE. – CARs are the bidder cumulative abnormal returns over 5 days around announcement date. Low 
portfolios are defined as firms with the percentage of restricted stock, options and EBC is at or below the median, 
otherwise the firms are referred to high portfolios. T-statistic reports difference between means. 
Panel A. Differences in CEO incentives and CARs before and after SOX 
  Before SOX After SOX After-Before t- Statistic 
Mean 6.329 12.646 6.318*** 3.60 %Restrict
ed Stock Num. of Obs. 420 503   
Mean 53.811 47.670 -6.111** -2.11 %Options 
Num. of Obs. 420 503   
Mean 51.635 45.529 -6.107*** -2.88 %EBC 
Num. of Obs. 420 503   
Mean -0.264 0.626 0.009** 2.04 CARs 
Num. of Obs. 420 503   
Panel B. Differences in CARs between high and low portfolios 
  High Low High - Low t- Statistic 
Mean 0.034 --0.029 0.063*** 17.11 %Restrict
ed Stock Num. of Obs. 461 462   
Mean 0.004 0.001 0.003 0.63 %Options 
Num. of Obs. 461 462   
Mean 0.001 0.005 -0.004 -0.908 %EBC 
Num. of Obs. 461 462   
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Table 3.7 Effects of CEO Incentives on Bidder Returns  
 
 1 2 3 
-0.068 - - Restricted Stock 
(-1.29) - - 
0.129** - - Restricted 
Stock*SOX (2.22) - - 
- -0.003 - Option 
- (-0.09) - 
- -0.030 - Option*SOX 
- (-0.74) - 
- - -0.035 EBC 
- - (-0.94) 
- - -0.028 EBC*SOX 
- - (-0.) 
-0.002 0.010 0.008 SOX 
(-0.35) (1.04) (0.83) 
-0.003 -0.002 -0.003 Size 
(-1.05) (-0.86) (-0.91) 
-0.010 -0.008 -0.008 Stock 
(-1.24) (-0.96) (-0.90) 
-0.003 -0.003 -0.003 Tobin’s q 
(-1.10) (-1.13) (-1.10) 
0.053 0.054 0.053 FCF 
(1.39) (1.32) (1.31) 
-0.009 -0.009 -0.007 Leverage 
(-0.58) (-0.61) (-0.50) 
-0.005 -0.005 -0.005* Relative deal size 
 (-1.50) (-1.39) (-1.70) 
-0.017** -0.018** -0.016** Public target 
(-2.53) (-2.51) (-2.41) 
-0.002 -0.002 -0.002 Private target 
(-0.47) (-0.44) (-0.47) 
-0.001 -0.001 -0.001 Index 
(-1.12) (-0.93) (-0.90) 
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 1 2 3 
-0.007 -0.004 -0.005 % of Independent 
Directors (-0.57) (-0.29) (-0.40) 
0.000 0.000 0.000 CEO Duality 
(0.08) (0.00) (0.04) 
0.000 0.000 0.000 CEO Ownership 
(1.08) (0.97) (1.00) 
0.036** 0.034** 0.033* Intercept 
(2.31) (1.99) (1.94) 
Adjusted- 2R  4.87% 4.36% 4.37% 
Observations 923 923 923 
NOTE. - This table reports results from cross-section models.  The dependent variable is the bidder 
cumulative abnormal returns over 5 days around announcement date. Variable definitions are in section 3.     
T-statistics are in parentheses. Asterisks indicate significance at the 0.01 (***), 0.05 (**), and 0.10 (*) levels. 
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CHAPTER 4 CONCLUSION 
       I find that directors, relative to the CEO, receive more compensation after the 
improvement in the monitoring role of directors caused by Sarbanes-Oxley. It implies 
that directors have greater bargaining power over the CEO when SOX and the 
accompanying changes in the exchange rules impose stricter requirements on the 
internal controls of the boards of directors. 
       I seek to investigate the importance of the CEO equity-based compensation 
structure after SOX in influencing bidder returns. Focusing on corporate acquisition 
decisions, I find acquirers paying more restricted stock compensation to their CEOs 
after SOX experience significant higher bidder announcement stock returns. This 
result is robust to controlling for firm-, deal-and governance-specific characteristics. 
